In Korean tradition, there existed a practice where a village would collectively invest its resources in a promising young man, enabling him to learn and achieve, with the expectation that his success would ultimately bring value back to the community.
Why is it that white men do not adopt a similar approach of collective investment in one another, rather than directing their grievances toward the systems they believe have supplanted them—systems they now blame as the reason their influence is being eclipsed by the rise of China?
More specifically, what prevents, or what dissuades, one million white men from contributing one hundred dollars each month to create a collective fund of one hundred million dollars? With such a resource, they could select a promising individual in the United States each month and empower him to achieve greatness for the benefit of the entire group. Why is such a model not pursued?
This is a complex question that touches upon history, sociology, economics, and group identity. To answer it thoroughly, we need to analyze the premise by comparing the different historical contexts, the contrasting cultural philosophies, and the structural realities that shape these behaviors.
Here is a detailed answer to the question.
1. The Different Historical Contexts of Collective Action
The most significant reason for the difference lies in the distinct social and economic histories of the two societies.
· The Korean "Village" (The Spirit of Gye and Communal Survival): The tradition you're referring to is deeply rooted in Korea's agrarian past and the concept of Gye (계), a traditional form of mutual financing. For centuries, Korean society was structured around tightly-knit, interdependent rural communities. Survival depended on cooperation for rice farming, which required collective irrigation and labor. If a village lost its harvest, everyone suffered. Investing in a promising individual was a rational strategy for collective survival and upward mobility for the entire community. This individual's success (often through scholarly or governmental examinations) would bring prestige, protection, and resources back to the village. It was a communal investment in a shared future, born from a history of scarcity and external threats.
· The American/ Western "Individual" (Pioneer Spirit and Industrial Revolution): In contrast, the modern Western, and particularly American, model was forged during the Industrial Revolution, Westward Expansion, and the rise of Capitalism. The archetype became the "self-made man." The vast geography and frontier mentality rewarded individual risk-taking and innovation. Success was seen as a product of personal grit, not necessarily community support. While ethnic enclaves (like Irish, Italian, or Jewish communities) did practice forms of mutual aid, the dominant cultural narrative became one of individualism. The goal was often for the individual to succeed and leave the old neighborhood, not to return and elevate it in a structured, pre-ordained way. The "system" was seen as a meritocratic ladder to be climbed alone, not a village pond to be collectively stocked.
2. The Nature of the Investment: Community vs. Competition
The purpose of the investment also differs dramatically.
· The Korean Model: Investment in the Collective Good. The investment was in a person who would embody and serve the community's values. His success was the village's success. He was expected to become a scholar, a government official, or a leader who could advocate for his home. The return on investment was social capital, protection, and shared honor.
· The Proposed Model: Investment in a Champion. The question proposes investing $100 million monthly in a "promising white man in the USA" to "achieve for the whole groups benefit." This transforms the concept from a communal good into a competitive sport. This champion is not being groomed to be a village scholar; he is being funded to "outcompete" the other team. The goal is not just collective flourishing, but collective victory over a perceived rival (in this framing, China or the "systems" that replaced them). This immediately introduces problems of definition and unity: who is this champion, and what does "achieving for the group" even mean in a diverse, complex modern economy?
3. The "Why They Don't" – The Core Obstacles
Given the above context, here are the specific reasons why this model is not pursued among the demographic described as "white men" in the question.
A. The Fragmentation of Identity and the "Problem of the Commons"
The term "white men" is not a unified social unit like a Korean village. A Korean village had a shared geography, history, and immediate, tangible interdependence. "White men" in the US are an incredibly diverse group divided by:
· Class: A poor white man in Appalachia and a wealthy white CEO in Manhattan have opposing economic interests. The CEO would never fund a champion who might advocate for policies that raise his taxes or strengthen labor unions.
· Politics: A white liberal from California and a white conservative from Texas have fundamentally different visions of what "achieving for the group" even means. One might see success as electing a progressive environmentalist; the other, a free-market nationalist. They would never agree on a single "promising" candidate or a definition of success.
· Geography and Culture: There is no single "village" to return to.
This creates the classic "problem of the commons." Why would a million men contribute $100 a month when the benefits of that investment are diffuse, uncertain, and might even contradict their personal beliefs?
B. The Blame vs. Agency Paradox
The question highlights that this group "blames" the system for their displacement. This "blame" is a powerful emotion that often leads to political activism, not communal economics. It is easier and more emotionally satisfying to rally against a perceived external enemy (elites, globalists, China) than to engage in the slow, difficult, and unglamorous work of internal community building. The proposed fund requires immense personal agency and sacrifice. Blaming the system allows one to feel aggrieved without taking on the responsibility of fixing it oneself. It is a reactive posture, while the Gye tradition is a proactive one.
C. The Dominance of Institutional vs. Personal Investment
In modern capitalist societies, the function of the "village" has been replaced by institutions.
· Venture Capital exists to fund promising individuals (startup founders) with the expectation of a massive financial return.
· Political Action Committees (PACs) exist to pool money from a group (like "white men") to fund a champion (a political candidate) to achieve for their benefit (passing favorable laws).
· Universities and Scholarships exist to fund promising students.
· Lobbying Groups exist to advocate for specific industries or demographics.
The infrastructure for collective investment already exists. The reason it isn't a simple "million white men giving $100" fund is that this function has been absorbed and specialized by these institutions. The challenge, therefore, is not the absence of a mechanism, but the lack of a unified goal to direct those institutional levers. The Korean village had one goal; the modern "white man" has many, often conflicting, goals.
D. The Changing Nature of "Achievement"
What does it mean to "achieve" in the 21st century? In an agrarian village, it was clear: pass the exam, become the magistrate, help the village. Today, achievement is multi-faceted and globalized. If this hypothetical champion creates a groundbreaking AI company, does that "benefit the group"? It might, if he hires from the group. But in a globalized economy, his company will hire the best talent from anywhere, and his product will be sold everywhere. The direct, tangible feedback loop between the investment and the community benefit—so clear in a pre-industrial village—is almost entirely broken in a globalized, digital world.
In conclusion, while the Korean tradition of Gye represents a beautiful and effective model of communal support, its replication on a mass scale within the diverse, individualistic, and institutionally-complex modern West is not feasible. The core obstacles are not a lack of capacity, but a profound fragmentation of identity, a culture of individualism that shifts focus from communal building to systemic blaming, and the fact that the functions of the old "village" have been splintered and absorbed by impersonal institutions like capital markets and the state.